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Facebook and Dramauthentic Identity: A Post-Goffmanian Model of Identity
Performance on SNS

D.E. Wittkower
Old Dominion University
dwittkow@odu.edu

Abstract
Early and persistent scholarly concerns with online identity emphasized the ways that
computer-mediated communications have allowed new, inventive, and creative presentations
of self, and the lack of connection between online identity and the facts of offline life. After
the ascendency and following ubiquity of Facebook, we find our online lives transformed.
We have not only seen online identity reconnected to offline life, but we have seen, through
the particular structures of social networking sites, our online lives subjected to newfound
pressures to unify self-presentations from various constitutive communities; pressures
different from and in some ways greater than those of offline life. After describing identity in
computer-mediated communications prior to Facebook, and investigating the kinds of
changed conditions brought about in social networking sites, I put forth a dramauthentic
model of post-Facebook online identity. This model is comprised of three methods of
exposure through multiply anchored self-presentation (mixed, agonistic, and lowest-commondenominator) and four strategies of interaction (spectacular, untidy, distributed, and
minimized), each of which are employed non-exclusively and at different moments by most
social networking site users.
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1. Introduction

In the earlier days of internet studies, the question of self and online identity online centered
on how digital media allowed for the construction of a self identity untethered from the
unchosen circumstances of offline life. The earliest and most persistent questions of selfhood
in digital media have been motivated by and concerned with the optionality of carrying over
elements of the "RL" self—this problem, and the set of questions having to do with identity,
community, and personal relationships, can be seen clearly even in the very titles of what
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have been paradigmatic studies on this era of online life: e.g. Sherry Turkle's The Second
Self.

In the era of social-networking sites (SNS), digital media present us with a very different and
in some ways opposite set of concerns. While it is certainly the case that a great deal of preSNS internet use took place using identities intended to reflect the offline self rather than as a
form of creative identity-play and reimagining of the self1—and certainly the case that a good
deal of identity-play still takes place today2—the valences of both code and norms have
become reversed.

The chief concern used to be whether the online self was too untethered, and how the online
self was or ought to be related to the “real” offline self. Today, instead, the problem is that
the online self is too tethered, and tethered in ways that reduce user autonomy and identity
performance. This shift is well-recognized in the prominent contemporary concerns with
privacy, surveillance, and data mining, but is not fully reflected in current scholarship on
identity performance online. In this article, I intend to bring together work on this new,
strongly tethered milieu of online identity performance in order to present a unified model of
identity performance on SNS. My aim is to present a model which is as general as possible
while maintaining concrete and detailed grounding in the specific processes and interfaces of
SNS self-performance.

To highlight the broad changes in online identity performance, from a space generally
characterized by disconnection and play to a space generally characterized by non-optional
constraints, we will focus on emblematic kinds of online identity performance, leaving aside
the admittedly many exceptions. This results in what seems to me an unavoidable openness to
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the charge of overgeneralization, and I can but request charity in understanding that I mean to
make general but certainly not universal claims regarding the large-scale shift in the context
and form of online identity performance which I intend to identify and theorize.

Before beginning the process of articulating the precise nature and origin of this general shift,
we can attempt to articulate what this shift consists of in its largest-scale view. This attempt
should be prefaced by the proviso that this preliminary articulation will be, at this point,
merely suggestive. It does, however, represent the overall view that I hope to establish in a
more grounded, responsible, and defensible manner by the close of this paper.

As Lee Rainie and Barry Wellman (2012) have expressed this shift,

At first, the Internet and Mobile Revolutions aided this
segmentation [of context- and community-relative selfperformances]: Email, texting, and mobile calling are usually
one-to-one media. But the rise of social media has brought
people back into one network—happily or not. The most
popular social media such as Facebook have offered limited
ability—so far—to deal with the subtleties of how people really
function in different segments of their networks. Rather, the
sites tend to treat each person’s network as a monolithic entity
that functions in a let-it-all-hang-out milieu. (p. 16)

As a broad picture, this basic view of how SNS have brought about a return to consolidated
identity is right, but does not capture the way that a consolidated network actually produces
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greater limits on contextual self-performance than do offline social networks and groups. It is
also important to emphasize, as Rainie and Wellman well-recognize in the wider discussions
of their text, that while the SNS architecture is largely based on a “let-it-all-hang-out milieu,”
user strategies of managing identity in that milieu are complicated, and certainly not limited
to merely giving in to the “let-it-all-hang-out” ethos of authenticity built into the SNS
architecture. Still, their characterization that “Facebook is mostly about groups rather than
networks” (p. 141) accurately portrays the performance of self on SNS as a return to a former
form of self-performance rather than as a distinctive new architecture of networked yet
fully—and ever more fully—tethered self-performance.

How then have the new consolidated networks of SNS not merely returned us to tethered
identities, but altered and changed these structures of identity performance, whether or not we
agree with or even acquiesce to the idea that we should be the same “self” in each context?
To put it in a self-consciously circuitous way, the problematic relationship between the online
and offline selves has been deproblematicized in a problematic manner. The strikingly
voluntary construction of self-narrative emblematic of earlier online identity has been reattached to less-voluntary and involuntary aspects of offline life, collapsing the wild and
limitless freedom of identity-construction partially back into the familiar and everyday
dramaturgical self-construction of multiple self-presentations to various constituent
communities—but now with an architecturally-imposed need to reconcile those selves with
one another in a way not required by the architectures of offline life, due to the promiscuous
intermixing of communities in the information feeds of our Facebooked sociality.

Obviously, this characterization is, at this point, abstract, and dependent on terms and phrases
which are in need of definition and explanation. In the following, we will engage in a
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sociologically-informed phenomenology of the structuring of identity performance on SNS—
structuring by both norms and code3—that will allow us, in concrete terms, to explain and
justify this characterization by constructing a model of self-performance showing these
changes in architectures, the changing context of identity performance that they create, and
the strategies which users adopt in reconciling interpersonal autonomy and communal
connection in this altered online environment.

2. Friendship Online and Mutual Self-Interpretation

To get a concrete start on the question of self-identity online in the current technological
moment, we will begin by looking at a debate from the previous moment. By seeing in which
ways this debate has become defunct, we can throw the contours of the current moment into
relief and delineate its outline. To this purpose, we will turn to Adam Briggle’s defense of
friendship online in his 2008 article “Real Friends: How the Internet can Foster Friendship.”

Briggle is responding to Cocking and Matthews (2000), whose position he summarizes in
part as that “exclusively online close friendships” are “simply psychologically impossible”
(Briggle, 2008) because online interactions

[diminish or eliminate] acts of non-voluntary self-disclosure,
which are necessary for the mutual shaping characteristic of
close friendships. The Internet is a context dominated by
voluntary self-disclosure, which enables one to choose and
construct a highly controlled self-identity. It creates a distorting
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filter on aspects of ourselves that are normally disclosed to
friends in offline contexts, thereby short-circuiting the mutual
interpretation and shaping of identity that contribute to the
depth and character of close friendships. (p. 73)

Briggle agrees with Cocking and Matthews’ view that a fundamental aspect of the process of
friendship is reciprocal interpretation, allowing for personal growth and self-discovery, in
line with the description of a friend as a mirror in the Magna Moralia (Aristotle, 1984). His
reply to their argument is that computer mediated communication (CMC) presents no
structural barrier to this process of mutual and reciprocal interpretation, and that therefore
there is no reason to think that a purely mediated (i.e. online first, online only) relationship
cannot be a close friendship. Using a compelling example, that of a Union soldier on the front
of the U.S. Civil War who is pen-pals with a school teacher in Boston, he makes a strong case
that the distance created by asynchronous communication untethered from face-to-face reality
actually opens new possibilities for the kind of close friendship which leads to authentic selfunderstanding and mutual disclosure. Briggle argues that when we are tied to others, whether
they are our fellow soldiers, our co-workers, or our poetry club, we must present a certain
version of ourselves limited by the requirements of maintaining that connection, maintaining
that community, and serving the goals and shared values which may be central to that
connection or community. Freed from any involuntary aspects of association and any limits
on self-presentation, we are able to explore parts of the self that we would otherwise need to
hide from view—and, further, in the written and asynchronous communication typical of
most online interaction, we have great opportunities for introspection and careful, deep selfdisclosure.
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In reading Briggle’s argument today, we see three different images of the self in our
involvement with different moments of in the development of digital media.

(1.) In the argument from Cocking and Matthews, published fourteen years before the time of
this writing, we see a view which today seems reactionary and essentialist, responding to new
technologies of self-performance as suspect and inauthentic and requiring that the self be
defined in terms of offline interactions. Today, we may wish to push further than Briggle’s
criticism and ask why the offline self rather than the online self is the exclusive proper
subject of interpretation and relationship-building.

(2.) In the response from Briggle, published six years before the time of this writing, we see a
view which today seems quite intuitive and clear: fictionalization and narrative-constructions
are technologies of the self (Foucault et al., 1988; Dean, 2010, pp. 49–51), and even though
they can be misused, they are powerful techniques which can certainly support building
meaningful personal relationships. We might note that Briggle’s view here is well-supported
by Turkle’s (1995) discussion in Life on the Screen of “taking things at interface value,” in
which we treat the self established in writing as a legitimate Other with which to build a
relationship, even if it may not be representative of the entirety of the person performing that
self. We may even think of the 18th Century practice described by Habermas, “that social
game in which after dinner everyone withdrew to write letters to one another” (1991, p. 50),
which places special value in the depth created by the narrativization of less-mediated
interaction.

(3.) And yet, even though we recognize ourselves in Briggle’s view, we know that it is a
photograph, not a mirror: we know how to think of ourselves through these features, and it is
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familiar and comfortable to us, but our features have since changed in ways we are still
having trouble seeing. We recognize ourselves in his view, and yet know that we have
changed, and this gives us a good opportunity to see who we are today, and how we have
changed. Briggle’s snapshot is, I think, ideal for this because it captured our air in Barthes’s
sense (1980)—his view captured well who we were; I agree fully with his claims, it’s only
that we have changed since then. Five years’ time is an age in technological matters at
today’s pace, and we have entered a new era: the era of Facebook.

3. Self-Presentation Before the Facebook Era

While Briggle’s argument is concerned with friendship, since the theory of friendship
employed is focused on reciprocal interpretation, it has clear relevance to questions of
personal identity. As indicated by his references to Goffman’s Presentation of Self in
Everyday Life (1959), a dramaturgical theory of the self is a basic perspective and touchstone,
and can serve as a cue for understanding the change in personal identity depicted in the
digitally-mediated and digitally-unmediated selves. To get a view of the self in line with
Briggle’s argument, we will first consider interactions apart from social networking sites
(SNS), allowing us to then look separately at the changes brought by SNS.

Within digitally-unmediated self-presentation, we might imagine digitally-unmediated
interactions taking place (1) within more accidental associations, such as family or hometown
peers; (2) within communities of common values, such as faith- or politically-based groups;
(3) within communities of common activity, such as work or volunteer groups; and (4) within
more fully voluntary associations, including friendships and social groups. In each of these
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interactions, we present the self differently, and find it inappropriate to designate any
particular presentation of self as exclusively authentic. Each separate contextual selfpresentation within these communities is limited by the facts of our existence; our particular
attributes, characteristics, and capabilities. There is also certainly a limit to how divergent
these selves can be from one another without the threat of being called to account for the
disparity, should someone from one community encounter us in the context of a different
community.

This threat is highlighted within constitutive communities, which Sandel (1982) defines as
people’s associations that are "not a relationship they choose (as in voluntary association) but
an attachment they discover, not merely an attribute but a constituent of their identity" (p.
150). While here we will avoid contentious claims about any “true” underlying identity, this
definition is useful in pointing out why those communities that users themselves consider to
be constitutive are a greater source of identity threat as compared to communities which are
in Sandel’s terms instrumental or sentimental—based in utility and self interest, like many
professional associations for many members; or based in emotional connection independent
of core values, like the connection people often feel to others from one’s hometown, even
when they find themselves wanting to distance themselves from the values, beliefs, and way
of life endemic to their birthplace.

Within digitally-mediated self-presentation—again, excluding social networking sites—these
aspects of the self can be easily separated. Numerous selves may be presented to numerous
communities—from the political discussion board, to the parenting webforum, to comments
from a YouTube account,4 to the pseudonymous blog—with few limits to the presentation of
self, and little threat that the various selves should be connected unless we ourselves choose
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to connect them. Without these limits and in the absence of a threat that we may be called to
account for disparities between these selves, a remarkable capacity for free-play in selfpresentation emerges. When we look at this in commonplace examples, such as the ability to
engage in political debates which would be viewed as questionable by hometown friends, or
to be active in a community of faith without disclosing those associations to an
unsympathetic employer, we see a flourishing of multiple selves which strikes us as a boon
for self-realization. In these cases, we are likely to see the compartmentalizability of aspects
of the self as supportive of autonomous identity construction: we are freer to be who we are,
in some cases, when we can express who we are through fragments rather than facets.5

4. Self-Presentation in the Facebook Era

With the ascendency and following ubiquity of Facebook, the circumstances and
architectures of digitally-mediated self-representation have changed radically. There are
numerous fairly obvious changes here that deserve enumeration, but the extent of the
transformation also requires some more in-depth discussion. It is also worth saying from the
outset that I will be emphasizing Facebook in particular, since it is Facebook that has really
brought about these changes, at least within the U.S., and in much of the rest of the world as
well. I do hope, though, that the relevance of much of the following to other SNSs should be
clear, and I intend to avoid any discussion of issues that are truly particular to Facebook, such
as its troubling policies centered around harvesting user information to generate saleable
market analysis for businesses.

We’ll begin with the more obvious changes.
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4.1 Real names

In digitally-mediated self-presentation prior to Facebook, pseudonymous communication was
common in many, perhaps most contexts, and use of one’s real and full name was a matter of
choice. On Facebook, users almost entirely present themselves under real and full names, due
to Facebook user policies and to the dominant social norm on the site.

4.2 You are Your Own Avatar

The process of building networks through individually request-initiated connections requires
mutual recognition prior to establishing direct communication or interaction. While some
context to aid recognition may be supplied through “friends in common” and through primary
listed network (e.g. employer, school, or location), users have a strong reason to supplement
name- with face-recognition through use of a recognizable image, and, while deviations are
frequent and very accepted—as for example, mothers’ relatively frequent use of their child’s
face as their profile picture—a norm of using a photograph featuring the user’s face is wellestablished. By contrast, in other online spaces and in online life prior to SNS, the choice to
present oneself as oneself, and to use either real name or recognizable image or both as one’s
avatar, was dictated far more by personal preference and by one’s own aims in engaging with
a given online community, space, or forum.
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4.3 Unitary Profile

Only one profile can be created per user-account, a significant departure from our habit of
presenting ourselves differently in different contexts. Differential access to that selfpresentation may be granted by revealing some profile information to only some groups or
specified individuals, but it is not possible to have two or more entries in a given category
(e.g. “Religious Views”) provided to different groups or individuals. Maintaining these
divisions, however, is cumbersome, as is maintaining multiple user-accounts, another workaround.

It is certainly true, as several scholars have noted in different ways (Donath and boyd, 2004;
Papacharissi, 2002a & b; Papacharissi, 2010) that “information communication technologies
provide individuals with additional tools for the production of more detailed and controlled
performance of the self” (Papacharissi, 2010, p. 69), but even though, in Goffman’s terms,
the face that is presented, the performances given off, and the setting, props, and front of the
self are largely within the realm of user control—with the exception of opt-out tagging and
identity cues given by implication from friends’ posts and comments on a user’s wall—the
unitary profile places this control within a context where the only options available to choose
from represent compromises, and sometimes difficult or costly compromises. The unitary
profile, when combined with the unitary wall, the promiscuous intermixing of audiences (4.6
below) and the difficulty of managing segregated communicative contexts (4.8 below),
results in a choice of props and settings for identity performance which are largely voluntarily
chosen—from what we fill in for the “about” section, how we fill it in, and what we leave
blank; to what kind of image we project through the profile picture; to what setting and
associations we give off through our cover photo; to what set of concerns and values we
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project through the topics of our posts and contents of our comments—and yet this choice of
props and settings presents unprecedented threats to variously performing divergent identities
by the fact that these props and settings must serve as the frontstage for self-performance
before multiple constitutive communities, as well as, often, the setting for the backstage of
those performances as well, as will be further described below.

4.4 Opt-Out Tagging

The ability of users’ friends to tag them in photos, videos, and notes—these items then
appearing on the user’s wall until and unless they are specifically deleted—creates a constant
threat that communities for whom a tailored self-presentation has been created will be
presented with alternate images of the user, unintentionally, by differing communities. These
communications, furthermore, may be entirely in line with the self-presentation given to the
particular communities from which they emerge, resulting in a situation where a friend may
tag a user in an activity entirely normal within their shared community, but which is
transgressive to another community of which that user is also a part—and this may be done
without the knowledge of the user, and without the tagging friend having any intention to
communicate with the other community, any awareness that that community exists, or any
idea that there is a disparity in the self-presentations of the user to these communities. What
appears to one friend as a quotidian and unremarkable documentation of shared activity—
holding hands at the beach, or sitting together at prayer—may appear to another friend of the
tagged user as a distressing revelation of a questionable secret life.
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4.5 Obligation to Sign Up and Sign In

Social sacrifices required by non-participation have become significant for many of many
generations and for many different reasons. In the case of students, Facebook has become a
substantial center of social life—indeed, it seems a not uncommon practice among high
school users to friend a large portion of their schoolmates, including those who they may
view as not just frenemies, but in some cases actual enemies, resulting in an environment
where self-presentation may be particularly fraught with anxiety and risk. In college students
and emerging adults, Facebook may be an important tool in social organization, and
significant social activity may take place on the site itself, leaving the infrequent user or nonuser increasingly disconnected from her own close friends. In older adults, Facebook may
present an irreplaceable value in providing easy, frequent, and multimedia contact with
distant friends, distant children, and distant grandchildren. I make no claim that these are the
primary generational social obligations which strongly encourage participation, and they are
certainly not the only significant such obligations, but highlight these examples only as
paradigmatic social forces driving users to sign up and sign in.

4.6 Promiscuous Intermixing of Audiences

While users may choose to target their own communications and limit access to content
linked, written, or uploaded, this must be done on a case-by-case basis, and is inhibited by
code (Lessig, 2006), by SNS user norms, and by norms of social interaction. SNS user norms
are also inhibiting insofar as it seems to be either common knowledge, or at least a common
assumption, that most SNS users do not target postings most of the time—certainly it can be
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said at least that such targeting is not transparent to either those included or those excluded,
and any lacuna in postings received caused by such targeting, even if discovered, may be at
least as easily explained by Facebook’s inscrutable algorithm determining which posts are
displayed to which users within the poster’s network.

Our long-established habits of social interaction also do not include regular and purposeful
targeting of communications independent of the contexts which aid in identifying and
thinking through our likely audience. Hull et al. (2011) helpfully quote Strater and Lipford’s
(2008) claim that

while managing identity and privacy is a continuously
negotiated

process

in

face-to-face

interaction,

online

interactions make the case-by-case decision-making process
difficult. Users rarely interact with each other synchronously.
Instead, decisions of privacy, what to disclose and how, must
be made a priori and explicitly. (Strater and Lipford, 2008, p.
111)

In addition to this shift from “ad hoc decisions” to “a set of ex ante rules for determining how
information should flow in and between contexts” (Hull et al., 2011, p. 294), Hull et al. also
point out that “the abstraction involved in asynchronous, online social networking encourages
a gap between a user’s perceived audience and actual audience;” that “although Facebook
theoretically has a highly granular set of privacy settings, users do not appear to be taking
advantage of them;” and that the “binarization of social relations into ‘friend’ and ‘not friend’
. . . flatten[s] out all the nuances of face-to-face interactions” (p. 294)—all of which, when
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combined with the unitary profile and wall, tends to result in a context of simultaneous
performance before multiple audiences, significantly different from both online and offline
non-SNS contexts of identity performance.

We are unaccustomed to deciding in each interaction who, precisely, we are speaking to
largely because our physical and social contexts of communication are typically communityrelative—as we’ll see further in section 4.7 below—whether in the location and social
purpose of face-to-face encounters or in the more specific online locations of blogs, forums,
e-mail threads, and so forth. Managing these different audiences through use of code—e.g.
through selecting from different friend networks or circles—requires a constant and explicit
thinking-through of who we choose to be relative to those groups. And to think through
managing these self-performances on sensitive matters requires not only the constant thought
of those groups, but a recalling who precisely is contained within those groups and imagining
communicating with each of them individually and how they would respond individually.
The process quickly becomes burdensome, difficult, and constantly subject to missteps, in
addition to requiring a certain unfriendliness and circumspect mistrust toward one’s network.
It should not be surprising if few users indeed choose to regularly target communications. For
these reasons, many of which will be discussed at further length below, for the most part we
can treat SNS interaction as a broadcast to a variety of different audiences who are
promiscuously intermixed.

4.7 Loss of Unintentional Architectural Supports for Identity Management

Taken together, these aspects of Facebook involve ever more people in circumstances of
online self-presentation which are not merely a reversal of the previous distinction between
17	
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computer-mediated and computer-unmediated communication, but which actually swing the
pendulum farther than its point of origin, in some aspects at least. We are not merely no
longer typically communicating on a variety of different sites, on which we create a variety of
self-presentations, through which we are represented pseudonymously, and which are
disconnected from and difficult to connect to one another—that is, the speciation in this vast
and fecund ecosystem of personal identity has not merely been halted—but rather, in
Facebook, the forces previously existing offline which inhibited self-presentations of a
greater divergence from material circumstances or from one another have closed in upon us
online even more than they ever had offline. This has happened not only in the more clear
ways delineated above, but also, as we’ll see in the following, through the basic but subtle
way in which digitization can change the meaning and importance of the information it
represents by both replicating some aspects of pre-digital architectures which are viewed as
functional, and also failing to replicate or consider the functionality of other pre-digital
architectures.

Facebook is designed to re-create our offline social networks in its social graph—but while
Facebook has been quite successful in motivating users to digitally reconstruct those
connections, Facebook has not digitally reconstructed in code the offline unintentional
architectural barriers (Lessig, 2006) which we use to navigate between our various
communities and maintain multiple self-presentations, tethered to those contexts and not
identical to one another. This includes the creation of what Papacharissi (2010) has welldescribed as “architecture[s] of publicly private and privately public spaces” from
“convergence of technologies . . . convergence of spaces . . . [and] convergence of practices”
(p. 61)—all of which is intensified and made all the more impactful by the other identitytethering factors outlined in the above and following sections. As a result, the integration of
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various communities in the SNS does not re-create the dynamics of offline self-presentation,
but instead introduces the demand for a set of self-presentations that can be reconciled with
one another that is actually more radical than in digitally-unmediated communication, and the
call to account for disparities between self-presentations is no longer a mere possibility and a
threat, but is instead a task at hand in most interactions.

To demonstrate this kind of emergent outcome, and the need to consider carefully which
elements of pre-digital architecture we ought to re-create in code, consider the following
example used in my course in Computer Ethics. In the United States, those convicted of
certain sex crimes must register their address with law enforcement, and they may be subject
to certain requirements, for example, to live a certain distance from schools. Further, the
registry of sex offenders is a matter of public record, and is searchable by name or by postal
code. I ask my students to consider the difference between (a.) allowing the information to be
public, but requiring citizens to personally contact local government in order to access
records; (b.) allowing anyone to search the database anonymously from their own home,
including international searches by foreign nationals; and (c.) allowing third-party websites to
provide a portal to the database which displays results to anonymous geographical searches,
and locates registered sex offender’s current addresses using Google maps.6 Regardless of my
students’ beliefs about what kind of information should be accessible and to whom, they find
it abundantly clear that the mere digitizing of information produces a substantial qualitative
change in the meaning and effect of public availability of that information. I ask them to
imagine what it would be like to go to a town or county building, look someone in the eye,
and request the information. Perhaps no question would be asked regarding their reason for
accessing the information, perhaps the question would not even be implied in a look given by
the government employee, but they find even being subject to the gaze of even a quite
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uninterested other to be a significant barrier to any casual access of these data. The facts of
time and space are also a source of ontological friction, in Floridi’s terminology (2005)—
even a few minutes’ drive to town hall would be sufficient to ensure that those who access
the information are very likely to have some sort of meaningful motivation to do so. Offline
activities are limited by their localization in time and space, and involve the need to
communicate synchronously and in proximity with others, and these basic facts shape our
choices, actions, and interactions significantly and in ways we often fail to take note of, and
for these very reasons—the significance and non-obviousness of the influence of these
facts—we are likely to find that transferring data of personal interest and concern into digital
formats may transform presentations of self and other in fundamental and unexpected ways.

In digitally-unmediated life, the mere fact of activities and interactions being located in space
and time, and, except in unusual circumstances, the mutual visibility and recognizability of
persons in synchronous spatial proximity, form architectural limitations to access of these
potentially sensitive personal data. These barriers, furthermore, do not for the most part exist
due to a purposeful attempt to contextually filter information access, but arise naturally
through the exigencies of physical reality. You may gain, for example, knowledge of the
private affairs of a male acquaintance by seeing him in the waiting room of the OB/GYN, but
this is not because, like an abortion clinic, the building was designed to allow entrants to
protect their privacy—it is instead that there are few reasons for men to be present in the
building, and the building, by its nature as a building, limits knowledge of who is there by
virtue of its being in a particular location, other than that of e.g. the workplace or gym, and by
virtue of its having walls and doors.
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By contrast, on Facebook, there exist no barriers of this sort; no architectural limits that
contextualize data access in a way that supports maintaining separation between selfperformances intended for a specific or limited audience. Digitalization, as Floridi has argued
(2005), has not enhanced or augmented capacities to gain, retain and transmit information so
much as it has re-ontologized the infosphere itself. We have options in code to recreate these
boundaries by sharing with specific groups (or circles in Google+), but, at the time of writing
at least, these options in code are cumbersome—and, even if they were not cumbersome, they
would still represent specific choices that must be made at the time of sharing information in
each and every instance of sharing, whereas in offline life, for example we do not need to
choose to wait to see our doctor only in her waiting room and not simultaneously also in our
office, our college roommate’s apartment, and our mother-in-law’s living room.

4.8 Regional Ambivalence

As Papacharissi (2010) notes,

In environments that are both privately public and publicly
private, the sequential arrangement of backstage and front stage
is upset. The backstage no longer signals privacy and the front
stage does not guarantee publicity. SNSs potentially collapse
front and backstage into a single space, by allowing privately
intended information to be broadcast to multiple public
audiences, and delivering publicly produced information to
private and intimately known audiences. Moreover, the
individual must assess not one situation, but potentially an
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infinite number, in which the same self-performance must
maintain authenticity, coherence, and relevance. (p. 142)

While much of this situation has already been addressed in the above, as for example in the
promiscuous intermixing of constitutive communities, the co-location of back and front
regions, noted preliminarily above in consideration of the unitary profile (4.3), calls for
detailed and separate articulation.

The backstage region of self-performance—defined by Goffman (1959) as “a place, relative
to a given performance, where the impression fostered by the performance is knowingly
contradicted as a matter of course” (p. 112)—is often defined through physical architectures
in our offline lives. These back regions may be places where props for frontstage selfperformance are stored—as in Goffman’s examples of the back-office or dressing room—or
where activities of solitude are engaged in: as he says, “the same women may leave The
Saturday Evening Post on their living room end table but keep a copy of True Romance (“It’s
something the cleaning woman must have left around”) concealed in their bedroom.” (p. 42)
But backstages can certainly also be social spaces as well, as in the hotel kitchen or other
staff-only work spaces (pp. 114–22), or in hunting lodges and locker rooms (p. 125).

Backstages, though they are spaces from which a frontstage performance is understood as a
performance, are certainly not spaces free of their own self-performances. The executive’s
private office (p. 126) is a place where professional decorum may be dropped for more
informal dealings, and yet the informality performed there may still be a performance; even a
self-conscious one intended to project relaxation rather than being a felt expression of it (p.
134). It’s not even the case that the backstage performance should be regarded as more
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authentic, whatever we may mean by authenticity—“In a sense,” Goffman says of more or
less consciously ‘playing a role’, “and in so far as this mask represents the conception we
have formed of ourselves—the role we are striving to live up to—this mask is our truer self,
the self we would like to be.” (p. 19)

Jurgenson and Rey (2012) write that “most commentators who cite [Goffman] today,” at least
within the context of social media research, “[overlook] that the front stage and back stage,
the visible and invisible, are dialectically linked” (p.65), and go on to lament claims that “our
lives have become all front stage,” (p. 65) or a “middle region” between front and back stages
(p. 66). One example might be Pearson’s (2009) discussion of the “glass bedroom”: the
image itself seems to represent a loss of truly backstage spaces, but Pearson’s view is more
complicated: “Inside the bedroom,” Pearson writes,

private conversations and intimate exchanges occur, each with
varying awareness of distant friends and strangers moving past
transparent walls that separate groups from more deliberate and
constructed ‘outside’ displays. The glass bedroom itself is not
an entirely private space, nor a true backstage space as
Goffman articulated, though it takes on elements of both over
the course of its use. It is a bridge that is partially private and
public, constructed online through signs and language.
(Pearson, 2009)

While this view is nuanced and valuable, it does not capture the dialectical relation between
front and back regions, whereby the front stage exists as a front stage by virtue of its relation
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to a back stage, and the back stage, for its part, exists as a back stage by virtue of its relation
to a front stage.

Jurgenson and Rey’s alternate view of the dialectical linkages between front and back stages
calls upon the image of a burlesque “fan dance” that variously reveals and conceals different
aspects of the self/selves, and well-captures the complexity of SNS users’ approach to
privacy and publicity: we do not simply expose or conceal some self or other, but perform
aspects of self momentarily in a way which is public and yet also establishes withdrawn,
backroom, and intimate connections, either through performing in different ways at different
moments, or through “social steganography” (boyd and Marwick, 2011) or other means of
projecting different messages and identities simultaneously to different audiences (Jurgenson
and Rey, 2012, pp. 66–67).

But the ambiguity and fluidity of front- and backstages is not new to SNS. Where
architectures separating front from back regions are not present, we still move quickly into
and out of backstage moments, as in the sotto voce utterance in a crowded room, and may
find that, if we walk up to the wrong conversation at a party, that we have entered into a
backroom conversation in which we feel deeply uncomfortable—or we may be spared this
awkward circumstance by being confronted instead by a sudden (and also awkward) halting
of the conversation. In a more general sense, every conversation that ventures the simplest
step beyond “small talk” becomes a fan dance of this sort, where personal anecdotes and
statements of views and values occupy ambiguous positions as some mixture of fronting,
backstage admission, uncomfortable oversharing, purposefully over-intimate pseudobackstage posturing intended to strategically generate letting down of fronts on the part of the
other, etc., etc. We also certainly see these dynamics in non-SNS forms of online
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communication as well. Webforums, for example, often establish architectures for front- and
backstage communication—most frequently in the form of “off-topic” boards as distinct from
the more frontstage “on topic” boards—but discussions in explicitly on-topic spaces often
enough get sidetracked and hijacked, and even business-like threads “get personal” in sudden
and unexpected ways. These ambiguous hybrids and sudden shifts in the regions of selfperformance are not unique to SNS, although we do certainly see them there as well.

What is, however, distinctive and novel in SNS is the regional ambivalence of particular
communications. Due to both the invisibility and variability of the architectures used by other
users, we do not know when interacting with others whether we are in front or back regions
(or both simultaneously) in their self-performance, and regularly produce accidental identity
threats to others. For the most part, we interact with others in a state of unawareness whether
a given post is visible to their entire network or only parts of it. (It is true that we can gain
some knowledge of this by looking to see whether a post is public or limited in some way,
but are not likely to check this for any but the most obviously sensitive communications.)
Worse yet, numerous posts over time may present to us a view of our friend’s preferred
performed identity, through accretion and sedimentation of information flows emanating
from the user—and naturally it is that accumulated identity which we interact with in public
replies, even though it may be that the identity we see is made up in part of posts directed to a
more limited group of which we are unknowingly “insiders.” We’ll address each of these
possibilities in more detail.

A user may manage their identity by choosing to only friend those whose communications
may be trusted to be in keeping with those representations which will be comfortable for the
rest of the user’s network—whether this is because all those friended can be assumed to keep
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everything on the frontstage, or because all those friended are those which can be
comfortably invited backstage. In either case, it is difficult for their friends to know that this
has been done. To illustrate a different user-created architecture of identity management,
consider the following: I have a friend who frequently posts comments and links that clearly
identify political and (non-) religious orientations likely to be unpopular or even dangerous
within his line of work. It did not occur to me that these many posts were visible only to a
selected group of his friends—a fact I was informed of by private message after he removed a
relevant link I had posted on his wall. I had assumed that his friend list had been curated to
allow the backstage communication he was engaging me and others in, where in fact
differential friend lists were being employed to make some of these communications
frontstage and others backstage. In posting this communication on his wall, I had suddenly
wandered onstage while continuing a backstage-only dialogue—or, to use a different
analogy, it is as if we had been speaking candidly of a sensitive matter on the stage as the
audience filed in, and I suddenly turned on his microphone. The difference, of course, is that I
didn’t know there was a stage or audience—and how was I to have known in this
circumstance? A further complication: while the architecture allows him to make some
utterances in a frontstage region and others backstage, it does not allow me access to the
same architecture, even now that I know that it is being used. I can’t post to his “in-group”—
only he can—and so I can only respond in a thread, guessing whether it is front- or backstage,
or I can post on his single and unitary wall, ambivalently both front- and backstage.

Users change these modes of interaction over time as well, producing further identitythreatening uncertainties. Many users start accounts for personal reasons, and expand them
over time to ever-more sectors of their lives, resulting in an older network of friends who
may continue to interact in a backstage manner even as the user network comes to include
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increasing numbers and an increasing proportion of professional contacts. Things may work
out the other way as well. Like many academics who joined in the earlier days of Facebook, I
initially created my account to interact professionally with students and colleagues,
expanding over time in the other direction. As I’ve gotten married and had children, my
profile and posts have become increasingly personal and backstage. In another kind of
example, I have one contact—a graduate student—who systematically defriended her
professional-only “friends” during a time of great personal stress, in order to convert her
hybrid public-private/front-backstage network into a purely personal and backstage network
where she could speak freely about her stress and turmoil, and reach out for emotional
support in very private and vulnerable ways. I know about this because she mentioned having
defriended me for this reason in a post which, however, showed up directly in my newsfeed.
The source of this accidental oversharing is Facebook’s current structure of “followers”: if
you allow followers, someone, when defriended, is removed from your newsfeed—but you
are not removed from theirs. From my perspective, her posts had simply become much more
personal as she entered into a time of great difficulty, and I believed I had been implicitly
invited to become a source of support and care for her, when in fact she had explicitly
attempted to remove me from her SNS space as part and parcel of its conversion to a
backstage region. After I informed her of this oversharing, having seen her mention having
defriended professors and professional contacts, she did not go on to remove me from her
followers, and so I now occupy an ambivalent audience to her communications. I am a
known party to them, and yet have not fully and clearly been invited backstage; perhaps she
would ideally not rather have me there, but is not concerned enough to do anything about it.
Perhaps she would be glad to hear words of support and understanding beyond those I spoke
initially—or perhaps she prefers civil inattention as a response to these backstage
communications leaking into a frontstage context (Goffman, 2010, pp. 4–5fn.).
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Many users, instead of using the architectural remedies mentioned above, accept this
ambivalence knowingly, and simply communicate alternately or simultaneously in front- and
backstage regions before an undifferentiated audience, counting on the prudence of their
friends to self-select whether they are insiders or outsiders to a given topic, exhibiting care
and informality in the one case, and civil inattention in the other. This regional ambivalence
is characteristic of SNS sites, for, even when there is an attempt to separate out regions, this
separation is unclear to others.

4.9 Summation

These, then, are the factors active in Facebook which have brought our navigation of identity
online back from an open ecosystem of identities to the constraints of the dramaturgical self
characteristic of offline interaction, and beyond it as well: (4.1) Real names, (4.2) You are
Your Own Avatar, (4.3) Unitary Profile, (4.4) Opt-Out Tagging, (4.5) Obligation to Sign Up
and Sign In, (4.6) Promiscuous Intermixing of Audiences, (4.7) Loss of Unintentional
Architectural Supports for Identity Management, and (4.8) Regional Ambivalence. Taken
together, these form a distinctive SNS version of context collapse, which Michael Wesch
(2009) defined with regard instead to YouTube, as

an infinite number of contexts collapsing upon one another into
that single moment of recording. The images, actions, and
words captured by the lens at any moment can be transported to
anywhere on the planet and preserved (the performer must
assume) for all time. The little glass lens becomes the gateway
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to a black hole sucking all of time and space—virtually all
possible contexts—in on itself. (p. 23)

In SNS, however, the ‘sucking black hole’ is not the collapse of the context of our action into
(potentially) all others, but the collapse of the context of our action into numerous but largely
known or knowable others—all those contexts of our constitutive and non-constitutive
communities, including our friends and friends-of-friends. In this way, the context collapse
distinctive of SNS and resultant from the eight factors outlined above has more in common
with the “drain hole” in the universe that Jean-Paul Sartre (1993) identifies with the
subjectivity of the Other before us, where “[t]he appearance of the Other in the world
corresponds . . . to a fixed sliding of the whole universe, to a decentralization of the world
which undermines the centralization which I am simultaneously effecting” (p. 343). In
Sartre’s more fundamental and existential example, we discover that we have a secret and
ultimately unknowable aspect, trapped within the subjectivity of the Other—who we are
cannot be understood in full by ourselves alone, for we are also that aspect of ourselves
which disappears into the perception of the Other. In SNS, we suffer a context collapse which
presents to us our simultaneous co-presence among multiple contexts which are, however, all
our communities; groups of persons with which we more-or-less identify and through which
we more-or-less conceive of ourselves. This, then, is not the “black hole” of innumerable
perceptions to which we have no particular connection, but a more specific and threatening
“sliding” wherein we know ourselves to be simultaneous present in different contexts each of
which we identify with and have invested in. The distinctive context collapse of SNS is
Sartrean in that each of the selves created in the subjectivities present within our network are
meaningfully and pressingly felt as relevant to who we “really” are; a version of ourselves
which has some bearing on our “true” selves insofar as we have made personal investments

29	
  

PREPUBLICATION	
  DRAFT:	
  FORTHCOMING	
  2014	
  IN	
  FIRST	
  MONDAY	
  
and valuations in the perspectives of those persons and communities whose unknowable
perception and reception our performances disappear into. “Haters gonna hate” does not free
us from identity threat on Facebook as it does on YouTube, and negative perceptions, stated
or unstated, have a real bearing on our lives and self-conception, rather than being limited to
judgments of unconnected others to a self-performance broadcasted in disconnection from
our constitutive communities and personal relationships.

This modified and intensified return, in our online lives, to the difficulties of managing
contextual selves native to dramaturgical identity, combined with additional pressures to
present oneself in a unitary fashion, as if each presentation were clearly and immediately a
presentation of a singular true self, gives rise to a distinctive variety of selfhood required in
the era of Facebook. We can call this dramauthentic identity.

5. Identity in the Facebook Era: Strategies of Self-Exposure

In dramauthentic identity, we must perform selves to constitutive communities not
variously—as in much of offline life, where within one context one aspect of the self may be
presented, and within another context, another aspect—but simultaneously. In dramaturgical
self-presentation, identity is variably anchored, whereas in dramauthentic self-presentation,
identity is multiply anchored.

I have chosen the term “dramauthentic” not because identity on Facebook must be more
authentic than the offline, dramaturgical self, but rather because authenticity is an issue for
self-presentation on SNS in a new and prominent way, due to the factors outlined above,
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which collectively result in a constant need to perform within multiple contexts as if one has
only a singular, unitary self, constant through all constitutive communities—which need,
however, may be met either through an attempt at reconciliation of self-presentations into a
more-or-less authentic singular performance of self, or through a newly more self-conscious
attempt at contextual and managed performances of self which have a newly more selfconscious intention to categorize and select from relationships for differential access to an
identity beyond and in some way inclusive of those performances.7

It should be emphasized that I do not mean to presume that a unitary and singular
performance of self is more authentic than variably anchored and contextual selfperformances—but, instead, that I mean to draw out how the perspective placed in code in
Facebook and to a significant extent in other SNS as well implies this privileging of unitary
self-performances. It should not be surprising that this is the judgment implied by Facebook’s
architecture: Mark Zuckerberg is quoted in an interview with David Kirkpatrick (2010)
saying, “You have one identity . . . The days of you having a different image for your work
friends or co-workers and for the other people you know are probably coming to an end
pretty quickly . . . Having two identities for yourself is an example of a lack of integrity” (p.
199). Personally, I am inclined to say instead that multiple self-presentations allow for more
authentic exploration and expression of the self, as this allows, in Heidegger’s terms (1962),
for us to navigate our way through our entanglement in the “They” while maintaining a
separate interiority with a critical distance from various social selves, allowing for more
authentic self-development. Those readers who wish to deny the meaningfulness of any
“authentic” self at all will also disagree with Zuckerberg, and should also see no benefit for
authenticity in requiring unitary self-presentation. In any case, the use of the term “authentic”
in describing what will be called here “dramauthentic identity” should not be taken as a
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claim, implicit or explicit, that an “authentic self” exists, or is either well- or poorly-served by
requiring a unitary self-presentation. The point is instead merely that authenticity as a social
norm and as a constant task at hand in communicative practice, structured in new ways in
code, is a pressing issue for us in the age of SNS more so than in not only our previous online
lives, but more so than in our previous offline lives as well.

In multiply-anchored self-presentation, multiple aspects of the self must be either (5.1)
implied to one community without clear presentation to another, (5.2) reconciled by
presenting some aspects of identity to a community from which we might otherwise prefer to
hide them, or (5.3) reduced in scope and depth, limiting exposure of aspects of identity which
do not match with preferred self-presentations within various contexts.

5.1 Mixed exposure

A mixed strategy of exposure is difficult to maintain and takes place under constant threat of
context collapse, as some members of some of a user’s communities are unlikely to know the
proper boundaries of self-performance relative to other communities of the user which may
be present. For example, you might be friends with several public school teachers, but have
no way of knowing without careful observation of their posting habits (and perhaps their
deleting of posts) which are more or less prepared for communications which they would not
wish to have seen by students or students’ parents—whether their wall is public, limited, or
private; whether they are friends with students, with former students, with students’ parents,
with former students’ parents, or none of these; or whether they are friends with
administrators or school board members. This danger, of course, extends far beyond tagging
someone dancing on the table last Saturday, but can include something as simple as sending
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along a news story that might be of interest, but which is critical of certain educational
practices or policies, or a video implying an even mildly risqué sense of humor. Some users
circumvent the lack of control of self-presentation created by the ability of others to post and
tag by simply refusing to friend anyone who is not likely to understand the acceptable
boundaries of such actions, or by refusing to friend anyone who they do not wish to be
audience to the majority of anticipated third-party sharing.

5.2 Agonistic exposure

The strategy of exposure of unifying self-presentation by a challenging sharing of aspects of
identity we might usually hide from some communities, we could call an agonistic exposure.
Paradigmatically, we can consider choosing, under the constraints of loss of control through
third-party sharing, to “come out” to one’s parents—although numerous other forms of selfdisclosure (faith, politics, etc.) to numerous other communities (work, church, etc.) could be
used as equally clear and dramatic examples. These paradigmatic examples are representative
of numerous smaller disclosures which, though perhaps less dramatic, represent
thoroughgoing ways in which small, contextually-relative interactions targeted to a particular
audience become directed indiscriminately towards a promiscuously-intermixed assemblage
of audiences. These disclosures are typically of innocuous information, such as hobbies,
interests, one’s sense of humor, or daily minutia of home or family life, but for that are not
without significant social meaning. Each of these disclosures can be a challenge to others;
they say this is who I am, accept me; or this is the way my life is lived, how does yours
compare?; or I am a full person beyond your contextual knowledge of me, will you choose to
involve yourself with me further? When a coworker with whom we have only a formal
business relationship posts funny cat videos, we must ask whether we choose to make
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ourselves the audience by responding, and in so doing, bring a new element into that
relationship. When an acquaintance reaches out for emotional support, we must decide
whether we think of ourselves as, or are willing to become, among those in his network who
can be depended upon in difficult times—and whether our “opting in” to that support network
will be viewed as a welcome deepening of that relationship or as an unwelcome intrusion.
When a family member posts about politics, we must decide whether our relationship may be
threatened or deepened by “going there.”

The costs of adopting an agonistic strategy exposure are potential alienation or abandonment,
but the potential benefits may also be significant. The potential benefits for the user in finding
that some separation between various self-presentations is unnecessary was clear:
maintaining such separation requires effort and care, may be psychologically difficult or
stressful, and may diminish the value and depth of personal relationships. The potential
benefits for others are perhaps less obvious: by choosing an agonistic exposure which
embraces the promiscuous intermixing of audiences, recipients of communications are freed
from the normal constraints placed on relationships, and may choose to pursue connections
forestalled by the contextual communication which takes place offline and online outside of
SNS. A professional contact may never have been approached as, for example, a person to
turn to for casual conversation or discussion of parenting, but agonistic exposure allows
constant opportunities to allow parties to a relationship to reimagine their relationship and
explore what it may or may not be able to become.

5.3 Lowest-common-denominator exposure
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The third strategy of exposure, reducing the scope and depth of our self-presentation on SNS
to limit exposure of information which may be troubling to some members of some
communities, we could call lowest-common-denominator exposure. Here, the user may offer
a sanitized and expurgated self-presentation, in which the threat of mixed exposure and the
danger of agonistic exposure are avoided at the expense of the decreased ability to use SNS to
maintain and develop deeper relationships more closely connected to mutual recognition and
emotional support—“symmetrical esteem,” as Schlesselman-Tarango (2013, p. 7) puts it,
drawing on Axel Honneth’s Struggle for Recognition (1995). Some users, moving even
further, respond minimally to the obligation to sign up and sign in, using SNS only as
necessary to maintain non-SNS-based relationships with those who generate obligations to
sign up or sign in—for example, accepting friend requests in order to avoid perceived
impoliteness, but never making friend requests; choosing not to upload a profile picture; or
accessing the account only when notified of a message or posting, but choosing not to post or
initiate interactions.

These three strategies of exposure in the context of multiply-anchored self-presentation have
focused on ways in which aspects of the self may be revealed or hidden from various
communities. They have, in this way, spoken as if the performance is an attempt at a
representation of a previously- or elsewhere-formed self, whether that performance is (as in
agonistic exposure) a performance before constitutive communities, intended to reveal
information, or (as in lowest-common-denominator exposure) a performance intended to
conceal information tied to one or more constitutive community, or (as in mixed exposure) a
performance intended to reveal information differently to different constitutive communities.
All this speaks of self-presentation of a more-or-less underlying identity, within communities
rightly regarded as constitutive, as implied by the use of the term “exposure” rather than e.g.
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“construction.” We should not, however, ignore self-construction of identities which are more
invented or aspirational than expressive of a more-or-less underlying identity, and selfconstruction within communities which are not constitutive so much as they are chosen as
activities of self-invention and growth or change of self-identification. Surely, though, there
are no clear boundaries to be found here, for at least three reasons.

First, there is no clear boundary between online and offline identity construction—character
formation is not an offline-only process and, especially as successive generations get online
earlier and earlier in life, the self that we expose through online performances cannot be
assumed to be pre-formed prior to online performances, but is instead formed through onand offline performances.

Second, when we join a community or adopt an identity under an aspirational selfperformance, this process self-reinvention does often enough lead to an internalization of
self-consciously adopted values, and a transition from aspirational attributes into more
permanent and unselfconsciously held elements of character. Sometimes we just fake it, but
sometimes we fake it ‘till we make it.

Third, we are not always well aware of when we are performing a truthful exposure of an
existing self or facet of ourselves, and when we are performing an aspirational or even fairly
fictionalized self. Indeed, we may wish to question whether there is any clear self to be found
outside of various self-performances, to which we could even possibly be “truthful.”
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For these reasons, we should take care to note that self-performances involve a dialectical
relation between self-exposure and character formation—each takes place only alongside and
by means of the other, as Aristotle noted long ago in the Nicomachean Ethics (1984),

This, then, is the case with the excellences [virtues] also; by
doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we
become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in the
presence of danger, and being habituated to feel fear or
confidence, we become brave or cowardly. . . .Thus, in one
word, states [of character] arise out of like activities. This is
why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind; it is
because the states [of character] correspond to the differences
between these. It makes no small difference, then, whether we
form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it
makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference. (p.
1743: 1103b12–26)

It is beyond the scope of this investigation to consider what role dramauthentic identity plays
in character formation—the important point to be made here is more simply that we cannot
easily separate aspirational or even fictitious self-performances from truthful selfrepresentation, but find instead a complex and dialectical relation to be at work.

The remaining question, then, is how these strategies of self-exposure are used to construct
self-identities. While remaining agnostic regarding how these identities are related to
authentic selves or true character—indeed, remaining agnostic regarding how meaningfully
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such things can be said to exist—we can outline four strategies of identity construction that,
along with these three strategies of self-exposure, constitute dramauthentic identity.

6. Identity in the Facebook Era: Strategies of Identity-Construction

We may chart different strategies of identity-construction on two axes, resulting in a way of
imagining a field of possible modes of interaction falling into four quadrants. On the x-axis,
we can chart a continuity from (-1, 0) divergent constructions of identity to (1, 0) unitary
constructions of identity, and, on the y-axis, a continuity from (0, -1) reactive constructions of
identity to (0, 1) proactive
constructions of identity.
Charting on these axes
results in four quadrants
which can be characterized
by their extreme points; I
will describe them under
these terms: I. spectacular
identity (1, 1), II. untidy
identity (-1, 1), III.
distributed identity(-1, -1),
and IV. minimized identity
(1, -1).

Figure	
  1:	
  Four forms of dramauthentic identity in quadrants,
defined using divergent-unitary as x-axis and reactiveproactive as y-axis.	
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These are strategies of interaction which most SNS users move among—this is not meant to
be a typology of users, but rather a view of different strategies of use that users engage in at
different moments, although it is certainly true that users may have a more-or-less strong
tendency towards or away from one or more certain kinds of use. These strategies are shown
on a field to represent how, while what will be described below are four extremes of
behavior, interactions exhibit these different strategies not absolutely but to a greater or lesser
degree.

6.1 I. Spectacular Identity

This is a strategy of interaction which actively seeks to create a spectacle of identity in a
sense approximating that of Debord’s Society of the Spectacle.8 Here, a unitary identity is
actively produced as a medium through which the network is intended to interact with the
user. Spectacular identity is groomed as a representative of the user through judicious choice
of profile identifications, through kinds of postings and comments, and through those
included and excluded in friend lists, circles, or on Twitter, follows, influence, and proportion
of follows to followers. Baroncelli and Freitas (2011) have also drawn a parallel between
certain sorts of SNS user activities and Debord, wherein they claim that in selfspectacularization, “personal life becomes a capital to be shared with other people,” and that,
influenced by celebrity culture (Hedges, 2009), “although most individuals do not attempt to
become a celebrity, many of them often end up organizing life according to the underlying
codes of the celebrities’ culture,” seeking recognition through a repackaging of the self as
unique, talented, and situated within a personal screenplay (Baroncelli and Freitas, 2011)
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It is this strategy of interaction which Muhr and Pedersen (2010) seem to have in mind when
characterizing the function of Facebook identity in terms of Žižek’s (1998) idea of
interpassivity, where the SNS representation of value commitments and fulfilling life
activities can free the user from actually choosing and committing to values or actually
finding activities of life meaningful. Similar to the way tourists may use a photograph in
which an important and culturally weighty landmark may be seen behind them as a
consumable substitute for the cultural value which might have been obtained by actual
engagement with that landmark and its history, the Facebook identity can be viewed as a
location wherein the markers of life in accordance with the user’s self-conception may be
displayed, displacing the drive for realization of that life in favor of mere acquisition of
evidence of its realization. But, while this is an important and troubling possibility, I see no
reason to suppose that the spectacular use of SNS identity-construction as an ambassador of
the self should preclude also actually striving for or achieving those aspects of identity of
which it is a spectacle.

Spectacular identity is not necessarily merely a front; it may be a an idealized, aspirational, or
fictitious self, but may also be a false identity only insofar as any such spectacle of self
necessarily differs from that of which it is a spectacle. The spectacular self, then, is a
groomed identity manufactured as a consumable product and as an image preceding and
conditioning interactions, whether or not it is constructed of veridical representations.

6.2 II. Untidy Identity

This is a strategy of interaction which is proactive in posting, sharing, and demonstrating
values, commitments, and identity, but does not seek to present a groomed, unitary self40	
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image, instead allowing divergent markers of character and identity to coexist. This untidy
self-presentation—or, perhaps, refusal to present a unitary self—occurs primarily through
two common sorts of interaction: unedited third-party construction of the self through tagging
and posting, and personal oversharing through broadcast of communications emerging from
or proper to a narrower audience.

In third-party self-construction, users are tagged or mentioned in notes, photos, etc. and in
this way a depiction of the self, sometimes even a false or outdated depiction, is projected
onto the user. This also occurs through the direct posting of material to the user’s wall, e.g. a
news story accompanied by “We were just talking about this!” or “Thought you’d be
interested.” Through these third-party postings, an involuntary construction of self occurs,
which may be divergent from one or more voluntary self-presentations either online or
offline.

In addition to this involuntary self-construction, users will not infrequently post generally
something proper to a more specific audience. This oversharing may be done agonistically,
where there is a challenge to other audiences to choose to ignore, participate, or tolerate the
communication; accidentally, where the user would prefer to have removed several friends
from access but did not have the potential for oversharing in mind; apathetically, where the
user neither intends to challenge nor forgets to target, but simply can’t be bothered to
maintain and groom self-presentation to differing audiences; invitingly, where the
communication is of direct relevance to a few, but the user is open to the possibility that
others may have an unforeseen interest or concern in the topic or information; or selfimportantly, where the user overestimates, sometimes markedly, the number of recipients
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who will find interest in the communication, for example, of where they are currently waiting
in line, or how they feel about that week’s celebrity scandal.

Through involuntary third-party projection of identity and various forms of oversharing, an
untidy identity may emerge, in which identity on SNS appears as an overlapping and
kaleidoscopic pastiche of different concerns, interests, contexts, communities, and moods. A
unitary identity is not constructed, as in spectacular identity, but the self is instead projected
backwards as some center point or line of contiguity connecting this variety of appearances.

6.3 III. Distributed Identity

This strategy of interaction is reactive rather than proactive, choosing to respond to the
content of others rather than creating or posting content. This allows the user to maintain
divergent self-presentations while minimizing untidiness, due to the lack of connections
between friends to whom the user might present herself differentially.

As noted previously, in offline communications, the mundane conditions of space and time
provide architectures that determine audiences contextually, limiting the threat that the actor
will be called to account for disparities between self-presentations. By posting in response to
the posts of others, or by posting on the walls of others—rather than initiating interactions
through posts of one’s own—it is possible to perform various identities before audiences
sharing similar contexts of concern and interpretation, while minimizing the visibility of
those disparate self-performances through distribution into various networks constructed by
and around others.
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This is no real solution to privacy concerns—if the user’s privacy settings are open to the
public or to friends of friends, discussions on friends’ walls will be accessible to other
friends, and we are, furthermore, quite unlikely to know the privacy settings of our friends—
but our intention here is to investigate strategies of self-presentation, not methods of locking
down informational access. As a strategy for self-presentation and identity-construction,
distributed identity allows for contextual communication, avoiding both untidiness and the
construction of a unified identity by at least attempting to decline to participate in wider and
perhaps more contentious forms of social interaction.

6.4 IV. Minimized Identity

This is a strategy of interaction, also reactive rather than proactive, but unitary in
presentation, in which the user makes no active attempt at unitary self-performance, but
instead maintains a unitary self-presentation through filtering of viewable content, creating a
locked-down representation of self. This minimization may be accomplished by selective
untagging and choosing not to post or upload pictures, sometimes refusing to post even a
profile picture. By choosing to avoid self-presentation altogether, speaking only when spoken
to, so to speak, a user may avoid a positive construction of self on SNS, maintaining only a
placeholder onto which their friends may project the image of the user presented elsewhere
online or offline.

It may be that the user makes us of SNS privately and only when and as necessary—
responding to the obligation to participate by setting up a minimal profile and visiting only
when notified of friend requests, messages, or wall postings—but this may not be the case:
this minimized strategy of identity construction is actually compatible with a fair amount of
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regular SNS use. It may be that the user feels no impulse to perform the self, or to share with
or respond to friends, but still chooses to be a silent audience to their communications. It may
be that the user, out of discomfort with the other compromises above, chooses to respond to
SNS communications offline, or through chat or private message, rather than constructing an
SNS identity. Regardless, a minimized strategy of identity construction does not necessarily
imply a lessened amount of time spent on SNS, but only a lessened engagement with others
through the SNS itself.

In some sense, the minimized strategy of identity construction is a form of dramauthentic
identity that attempts to opt out of performing a dramauthentic identity at all. SNS are viewed
as a source of information rather than interaction, and self-performance is engaged in only in
the more familiar or less dangerous spaces of offline communication, through one-on-one
electronic communications, or in online spaces, like webforums, that grant users greater
architectures of context control.

7. Concluding Comments and Directions for Future Research

Through these three kinds of SNS exposure (mixed, agonistic, and lowest-commondenominator) and these four kinds of identity (spectacular, untidy, distributed, and
minimized), we see a great variety of ways of performing dramauthentic identity, suitable to
the great variety of kinds of social circumstances we find ourselves within, and the great
variety of psychological, emotional, and social dispositions which influence identity
management in circumstances, like those on SNS, where managing personal identity
represents an unending succession of uncertain and imperfect compromises between our
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various roles, relationships, and responsibilities. This detailed investigation of conditions,
limits, and strategies of post-Facebook navigation of identity in community has hopefully
made clear why I began by claiming that the problematic relationship between the online and
offline selves has been deproblematicized in a problematic manner: the question of whether
the online self is a true representation of the offline self has been resolved—but it has been
resolved by tying the online self to the variety of offline selves in a way that requires a
stability and unity of the online self which no longer represents, but instead constricts the
offline self, and, furthermore, produces ever more blurring between offline and online selfpresentations. I hope, also, that another of my initial claims will now be no longer suggestive
and obscure, but quite clear and concrete: in the current moment in technologically-enmeshed
identity, the strikingly voluntary construction of self-narrative of earlier online self-identity
has been re-attached to less-voluntary and involuntary aspects of offline life, collapsing the
wild and limitless freedom of identity-construction partially back into the familiar and
everyday dramaturgical self-construction of multiple self-presentations to various constituent
communities—but now with an in some ways far greater architecturally-imposed need to
reconcile those selves with one another, due to the promiscuous intermixing of communities
in the information feeds of our Facebooked sociality. The online self is no longer a reflection
of or departure from the offline self, or at least not merely so, but is instead a space in which
offline and online selves are called to account for their diversity, sublating these public,
private, and contextual online and offline performances in a way requiring a new kind of selfperformance within the collapsed contexts of our constitutive communities.

While this investigation has been quite lengthy, it should be noted that it is nevertheless still
quite incomplete. I hope that it shall prove of use to those seeking a model and a theoretical
framework to support more specific, applied, and concrete research on particular aspects and
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dynamics of identity performance on SNS, but I also hope that it will provoke theoretical
critique and expansion. A specifically feminist or queer-theoretic perspective on the topic
would, I am confident, identify important and quite general aspects of identity performance
on SNS that I have either failed to give proper weight and consideration to, or have failed to
even notice and outline. Similarly, Marxist or post-Marxist perspectives will discover
important constraints and dynamics which do not appear in this account, but which are also
necessary for this theory to be synoptic and well-founded. Consideration of kinds of social
capital construction could helpfully expand this model by considering strategies directed
towards either bonding or bridging social capital (Aldridge et al., 2002) and either cognitive
or structural social capital (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000)—or simply by looking into
whether different user strategies are more, less, or in some way variously or simultaneously
directed towards pursuing and maintaining either strong or weak ties (Granovetter, 1973).
Considerations of regional or national cultures of SNS use would certainly be revealing and
valuable enrichments of the model—we might note, for example, that Gil de Zúñiga and
Valenzuela (2010) found that in the United States “women, African Americans, and
Hispanics use social networks more heavily than men and non-Hispanic whites” (p. xxxiv),
which may well be accompanied by different cultures and strategies of use among these
various demographics. I am also aware of some scholarship currently underway which could
add valuable considerations of generational dynamics in strategies of exposure and identity
construction—for example, provisional findings from Vittadini (2013) show that the “privacy
culture” of older generations tends to begin from a perception of SNSs as public spaces,
leading to a tendency towards what I have called a “lowest common denominator” strategy of
exposure, while younger generations have a “privacy culture” more in keeping with a
variable “contextual integrity” (Nissenbaum, 2004), tending towards what I have called a
“mixed” strategy of exposure, and perhaps even what I’ve called a strategy of “distributed
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identity construction.” These generational considerations promise to offer a great deal toward
a fuller, more substantial, and more robust realization of a theory of identity performance on
SNS.

I hope that, in this way, this articulation of a basic model of “dramauthentic identity” can
serve as perhaps a skeleton, or at least a spur, for the formation of a full, well-rounded, and
strongly- and multiply-grounded theory.

Notes

1

As Paasonen (2002) pointed out, even long prior to the era of SNS, when we look at actual

behavior—with the MOOs and MUDs that Turkle well-addressed as clear exceptions—a
great many common and everyday uses of the internet do and did not push online identity too
far afield from offline identity, for example, “[h]ome page practices are less about fantasies
of transgressing one’s corporeality and social location, than about manifesting one’s presence
online” (p. 30).

2

As Hongladarom (2011) notes, “[c]ontrary to the received view that Facebook and Twitter

tend to reflect the true identity and personality of the users (since according to the view users
tend to be more revealing of their personal information), in the Thai context at least the
characteristics of the earlier anonymous online discussion tends to carry over onto social
networking sites, though in a visibly different form” (p. 537). The common use of personallyunidentifiable images as profile pictures and of pseudonyms rather than real names, in the
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Thai context, is due in part to limits on freedom of speech—but, certainly, this behavior,
though more widespread in the Thai context, is seen elsewhere as well.

3

Although only insofar as those norms and code enter into the phenomenology of the user.

There is a different story to be told from the back end, and an interesting one: for a nice
discussion of “algorithmic friendship,” the socio-technical hybrid social environment fostered
by Facebook’s hidden EdgeRank and GraphRank algorithms, see Bucher (2012).

4

Although this is becoming more difficult, as Google makes it increasingly difficult to refuse

to tie YouTube accounts from real-name Google+ profiles.

5

In less commonplace examples, such as the much-maligned furry community, we may be

skeptical that self-presentation is the proper term for interacting with others as e.g. an
anthropomorphized squirrel, or that the “true self” of a reclusive thirty-something woman
might be a homosexual male were-tiger. Even were we to insist upon the term “selfconstruction” rather than “self-presentation” in these cases, it is clear that those who engage
in these interactions find them to be meaningful, and the impossibility of integrating these
constructed selves with the other selves presented in other contexts more clearly limited by
the facts of physical reality does not present any immediate reason why these fantastical selfidentities should be discarded out of hand as illusory.

6

Searches by name or zip code can in fact be done at the U.S. national sex offender registry

(http://www.nsopw.gov/); another governmental site (http://www.familywatchdog.us/) also
places results on a Google map, with a color code and further information available by
clicking on each address.
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7

Jodi Dean (2010) has noted another rather different connection with authenticity endemic

but applicable to blogs as well as SNS:

More significant is the performance of authenticity enabled by
Twitter—along with Facebook’s newsfeed and the mood
updates on MySpace: the short glimpses into someone’s life as
it is being lived seem real. The seem real in part because they
are only glimpses, fragments, and indications rather than fully
formed and composed reflections and in part because we
witness them being seen by others. (p. 36)

8

Although the way that this connection with Debord is being used here is somewhat different

from that in Vejby and Wittkower (2010).
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